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The Hon. John C. Lifland, Senior District Judge of the United States District*
Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 05-3227/3525
FELICIA LINDAASTUTY,
Petitioner No. 05-3227
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES; USCIS, 
District Director, DHS Local 
Removal Officers, and all Officers 
and Employees having physical 
custody of Petitioner,
Respondents
FELICIA LINDAASTUTY,
Petitioner No. 05-3525
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
Petition for Review from a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Donald Vincent Ferlise
Agency No. A95-146-362
Before: McKEE and GARTH, Circuit Judges,
and LIFLAND, Senior District Judge*
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 16, 2006
(Opinion filed:June 28, 2006)
2OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Felicia Lindaastuty asks us to review an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings (No. 05-3227).  We also
have a petition for a writ of habeas corpus Lindaastuty filed in the district court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which she challenged the legality of her detention after the
removal order became final.  Pursuant to the Real ID Act, the district court transferred
the habeas petition to us (No. 05-3525).  
For the reasons that follow, we will deny her petition for review and dismiss her
habeas petition as moot.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Felicia Lindaastuty is a native and citizen of Indonesia.  She was admitted into the
United States on or about December 5, 2000, as a visitor for pleasure with authorization
to remain until June 4, 2001.   On November 13, 2001, the former INS issued
Lindaastuty a Notice to Appear charging her with removability pursuant to INA §
237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained in the United States
for a time longer than permitted.  At a hearing on January 10, 2002, Lindaastuty,
represented by counsel, conceded her removability and stated that she intended to apply
for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief.  That relief was denied by the
Immigration Judge, and she appealed to the BIA.  The BIA affirmed and dismissed her
In Velarde-Pacheco, the BIA held that an alien who entered into a marriage after1
commencement of removal proceedings can have a motion to reopen for adjustment of
status granted, notwithstanding the pendency of a visa petition filed on behalf of the alien
by the spouse, where the alien has presented clear and convincing evidence that the
marriage is bona fide.
3
appeal on February 14, 2005.  Lindaastuty did not file a petition for review of the BIA’s
decision affirming the IJ’s denial of her claims for relief.
On March 2, 2005, Lindaastuty filed a timely petition to reopen her removal
proceedings in order to apply for adjustment of status.  She claimed that she had married
a United States citizen during her proceedings and he had filed a visa petition on her
behalf.  On March 31, 2005, the BIA denied her motion to reopen, finding that she had
not provided clear and convincing evidence of the bona fides of her marriage as required
by Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 2002).   Lindaastuty did not1
file a petition for review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen.  
On February 24, 2005, prior to the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen,
Lindaastuty received a Notice from Customs and Immigration Services requiring her to
appear for an interview on June 24, 2005, in regard to her application for adjustment of
status based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen.  
On April 25, 2005, Lindaastuty filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA, seeking
to present new evidence of the bona fides of her marriage.  On June 23, 2005, the BIA
Lindaastuty does not challenge the BIA’s characterization of her motion to2
reconsider as a motion to reopen.  
Generally, the BIA has the authority to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte in 3
“exceptional situations.”  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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denied that motion.  The BIA treated her motion as a motion to reopen  because she had2
not alleged that the BIA had made any error of fact or law in its previous decision (the
standard for a motion to reconsider).  The BIA then denied her second motion to reopen
because it exceeded the numerical limitations for motions to reopen.  See 8 C.F.R. §
10103.2(c)(2).   The BIA also stated that it did not find “any exceptional circumstances
to justify reopening on [its] own motion.”   It noted that Lindaastuty “did not file her3
prior motion pro se, but was represented by counsel.  [Lindaastuty] married on November
20, 2004, and filed her prior motion on March 2, 2005, thus giving her over 3 months
and 1 week to get her documentation in order.”  Lindaastuty filed a petition for review of
the BIA’s denial of her second motion to reopen which is the petition now before us.
As noted, Lindaastuty was scheduled to appear for an interview regarding her
application for adjustment of status on June 24, 2005.  However, because the BIA had
issued its decision on June 23, 2005, denying her second motion to reopen, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took her into custody pursuant to what was
now a final order of removal.
On July 15, 2005, Lindaastuty filed a petition for a  writ of habeas corpus in the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging her post-removal proceedings
To the extent that this argument can be construed as a challenge to the BIA’s4
refusal to reopen sua sponte, we are without jurisdiction to entertain that challenge. See
Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (“Because the BIA retained unfettered
discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this
court is without jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to
reopen or reconsider the case.”).
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detention.  Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, the district court  transferred Lindaastuty’s
habeas petition to us.  We consolidated it with the petition for review.  
II. DISCUSSION
A. Petition for review of BIA’s June 23, 2005 
order denying the motion to reopen.
In challenging the BIA’s June 23, 2005, denial of her motion to reopen,
Lindaastuty argues that she is entitled to reopen based on a “change in circumstances,”
viz., the approval of her husband’s visa petition.  Lindaastuty’s Br. at 12-14.   She also
argues that she is entitled to reopening “as befit[s] any good citizen of the community.”
Id. at 13.  In addition, she contends that “there is extreme and unusual hardship on the
part of her US citizen husband if she is deported to her native country, considering that
they were newly married at the time of her detention, and were looking forward to
hav[ing] a family in the US.”   Id. at 13-14.  4
However, she never addresses the BIA’s reasons for denying her motion to
reopen; i.e, that it was her second motion to reopen and, therefore, it exceeded the
numerical limitation on motions to reopen.  Thus, she has waived that issue for purposes
of our review. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002)
The government contends that it did not use the adjustment of status procedure to5
“surprise” her.  It claims that DHS scheduled her adjustment of status interview in the
ordinary course of processing visa applications, and that the BIA’s decision denying her
second motion to reopen the day before her interview was simply happenstance. 
Government’s Br. at 9 n.4.  
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(“Failure to set forth an issue in an appellate brief waives that issue on appeal.”). 
Therefore, her petition for review must be denied.
B. The habeas petition.
As noted earlier, Lindaastuty was scheduled for an interview regarding her
application for adjustment of status on June 24, 2005.  However, because the BIA denied
her second motion to reopen on June 23, 2005, the DHS took her into custody at that
hearing in furtherance of a final order of removal.   Pursuant to that order, Lindaastuty
has been removed to Indonesia.
In her habeas petition, Lindaastuty does not challenge the removal order, but does
challenge the legality of her detention based on her contention that the “use of the
adjustment of status procedure to surprise applicants with sudden reinstatement of their
deportation orders raises fundamental [due process] concerns.”   Lindaastuty’s Br. at 9.  5
However, the government concedes that because Lindaastuty is challenging the
legality of her detention after a final removal order has been entered (and not the removal
order itself), the district court had jurisdiction to entertain her habeas petition.  See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (Supreme Court held that district court
retained habeas jurisdiction over challenges to post-removal-period detention even after
7changes the INA made in 1961 and 1996).  
Section 106(a)(1)(B) of the REAL ID Act adds a provision to the INA that
provides that a petition for review filed in the Court of Appeals “shall be the sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal [n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including § 2241 of title 28, United States
Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title.”  8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (added by REAL ID Act).  However, the Conference Report
accompanying the REAL ID Act makes clear that the purpose of this provision, along
with related provisions of the REAL ID Act, was to “address the anomalies created” by
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), under which criminal aliens, although precluded
from seeking habeas review of their removal orders in the Court of Appeals, could obtain
habeas review in the district court under § 2241.  H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, reprinted in 151
Cong. Rec. H2813, H2873 (May 3, 2005).  The Report specifically states that “section
106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent
of challenges to removal orders.  Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only
over challenges to removal orders.”  Id.  
Because Lindaastuty’s habeas petition challenges the legality of her post-removal
proceedings detention and not the removal order, the appropriate remedy would be for us
to transfer Lindaastuty’s habeas petition back to the district court.  However, because
Lindaastuty has already been deported and  is, therefore, no longer in custody, the
8challenge to her detention is moot and the habeas petition must be dismissed.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we will deny Lindaastuty’s petition for review and dismiss
her habeas petition as moot.
 
